In 2020, the Swiss insurer payment model will include a set of sophisticated morbidity indicators in the form of Pharmaceutical Cost Groups (PCGs), added to a payment model currently largely based on age, gender, and a crude morbidity indicator. Adding powerful risk adjustors reduces underpayment for previously highly underpaid groups but creates a new group of the highly overpaid. We characterize the diseases and patterns of health care spending in the top .1% and 1% of the highly underpaid and the bottom .1% and 1% of the highly overpaid in the new Swiss payment model. The under and overpaid share some of the same health conditions, among them kidney disease. The highly underpaid account for a massively disproportionate share of the unexplained variance in the new payment model. Membership in the tails of the distribution of spending residuals after risk adjustment is persistent, implying that the highly over and underpaid merit special attention in design of insurer payment models.
Introduction
In 2020, Switzerland will revise the risk adjustment formula used to pay health insurers in its universal canton-based system. For the first time, the Swiss model will include a set of sophisticated morbidity indicators in the form of Pharmaceutical Cost Groups (PCGs), added to a payment model currently largely based on age, gender, and a crude morbidity indicator. The principal motivation in Switzerland (and elsewhere) for revising morbidity indicators is to improve fit of the payment model to better match insurer spending at the individual and illness-group level.
1 Schmid and Beck (2016) and Trottmann et al. (2015) find that adding the PCGs improves the individual-level fit of the payment system as measured by an R 2 from 15% to 21%.
The potential of morbidity-based risk adjustment to improve the functioning of individual health insurance markets is widely accepted. With community-rated premiums, risk-adjustment transfers that pay more for enrollees likely to be high-cost, and less for those likely to be low-cost, balances the incentives facing insurers to accept and serve the more and less sick within an insurance pool. 2 It is also well-known that risk adjustment reduces but does not eliminate underpayment for very sick/highcost individuals. In Germany, The Netherlands and the U.S. state-based Marketplaces, all with sophisticated morbidity-based payment models, underpayments after risk adjustment for some individuals run into the millions of euros or dollars.
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Less well-known is that morbidity-based risk adjustment systems create a mismatch between payment and spending that was not there before. Morbidity-based indicators used for risk adjustment are correlated with high spending, but the correlation is far from perfect. Some individuals get flagged for high payment amounts in the risk adjustment systems, but then, for whatever reason, insurers spend much less on their care. Risk-adjusted payments exceeding insurer spending run into the hundreds of thousands of euros or dollars for some individuals in the three countries referred to above (McGuire, Schillo, & van Kleef, 2018 ). This overpayment is only possible with powerful morbidity indicators meant to predict high costs. In other words, introduction of morbidity-based risk adjustment may improve market functioning overall and transfer more funds to high-spending individuals; but at the same time, using powerful indicators for payment has the unintended consequence of creating a new group of the highly overcompensated.
Introduction of a set of morbidity indicators in the Swiss payment system allows quantification of the effect of adding the new indicators on the distribution of under and overpayments. The purpose of this paper is to characterize the extremely over or undercompensated individuals in the new Swiss payment system. Section 2 contains a brief summary of the current and planned Swiss risk-adjustment model.
Section 3 describes the data used in this paper for estimating the current Swiss risk-adjustment model and the model including PCGs to be implemented in 2020. Section 4 characterizes the costs, payments, diagnoses and some other elements of health care use of the top and bottom 1% and .1% of the net compensation distribution. By simulating both the current and the new risk adjustment model, we show that while the new model better compensates the very high-cost individuals, it enlarges the tail on the other side of the net compensation distribution. Section 4 also shows that over and undercompensation tend to persist over time for the same individual. Focus on the few is justified, for as we will show, the one-in-a-thousand people on both ends of the distribution of net compensation have a massively outsized impact on the statistical metrics conventionally used to assess performance of risk adjustment models. Perhaps the most striking finding of our paper is that fully one-third of the unexplained variance (after risk adjustment) is accounted for by one one-thousandth of the population.
Section 5 considers possible directions for research and policy to contend with extreme over and undercompensation in the new Swiss payment model.
Health Insurer Payment in Switzerland 4
Compulsory health insurance in Switzerland is organized according to principles of regulated competition first advanced by Enthoven (1980) to maintain risk solidarity, affordability of health plans, and incentives for efficiency. Broadly, health plans and providers compete on price and quality to ensure efficiency, and premium regulation and subsidies for low-income individuals ensure individual affordability of health plans and risk solidarity between low-and high-risk individuals. , gender, and a hospitalization flag dummy resulting in 1,560 risk groups. In 2012, RA switched from a concurrent to a prospective calculation, i.e., risk adjustors from the previous year are used to predict spending in the current year.
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Weights are calculated with a straightforward cell-based approach. A cell weight is mean net spending.
Net spending is spending the insurer is responsible for, that is, total spending minus copayment and the cantonal contribution for inpatient stays. 8 The RA payment (positive or negative) to an insurer equals the difference between the average predicted net spending for that group (in a given canton) and the average net spending in the respective canton. The total amount of RA transfers received from/paid to insurers was 8.4 billion CHF 9 in 2016, about one-fourth of insurer net spending in the Swiss compulsory basic health insurance (FOPH, 2018, p. 143) ; for further details see Schmid, Beck and Kauer (2018) ).
Pharmaceutical cost groups (PCGs) will be added as an additional morbidity indicator to the RA-formula in 2020. These groups are a morbidity measure deduced from the use of prescribed drugs. PCGs group drugs classified by their active pharmaceutical ingredient. 10 A PCG flag turns on when previous year drug consumption passes a threshold defined by a standardized daily dose. Standardized daily doses take package size and concentration of active ingredients into account. PCGs have been applied in The Netherlands (van Kleef, Eijkenaar, van Vliet, & van de Ven, 2018) , Germany (Wasem, Buchner, Lux, & Schillo, 2018) , and elsewhere. Detailed regulations to determine the form of the PCGs for Swiss 5 This risk adjustor was identified as a readily available predictor of spending in the following year with a low risk of gaming (Beck, 2000) . Since hospital stays are paid prospectively based on a Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) classification model, the hospital has no financial interest in prolonging length of stay. 6 These are: 19-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66-70, 71-75, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90, 91+ years; children are excluded from risk equalization. 7 The hospitalization flag is already prospective "last year hospitalization". So, in the current system, a cell is based on hospitalization two years ago. 8 RA is applied to full-and partial-year eligible so in practice the mean is figured on a monthly basis. 9 1 CHF equals roughly 1 US$ or .88€. 10 The classification is based on the ATC-code which is a drug classification system of the WHO (https://www.whocc.no/atc, accessed on 2018/11/20) and corresponds to the US NDC code (Ellis, Martins, & Rose, 2018) . ATC refers to the anatomic, therapeutic and chemical significance of the ingredient. ATC-codes are routinely collected together with drug costs by Swiss health insurers. Lamers and Van Vliet (2003) showed in the Netherlands that ATC-codes can be used to identify some chronically ill people by prescribed drugs.
risk adjustment (effective in 2020) have not yet been finalized, but a PCG indicator has been used for many years by some Swiss insurers to set their contracts with provider groups bearing risk in managed care plans (Trottmann, Zweifel, & Beck, 2012) . A blueprint for the planned PCG definition is therefore available on which this study can be based.
PCG weights are estimated on national data and the weights set uniformly in the 26 canton-based RA models. The property of no redistribution among cantons will be maintained by recalibrating cantonal averages as weighted averages of (cantonal) age, gender, and hospitalization means and (national) PCG-contributions. We provide detailed documentation for the methodology we use to calculate the RA transfers for this study in the appendix. We do not analyze the temporary RA scenario implemented from 2017-2019 which included a drug threshold as an additional risk adjustor. This temporary system was meant to be a transition to including the PCGs (Schmid, Beck, & Kauer, 2018) . we have information about spending, copayment, 12 and the enrollee premium. Spending includes all payments the insurer made to a provider. For inpatient hospital stays, the canton in which the patient resides pays 55% of the costs directly to the provider. These payments are not insurer responsibility so are properly not part of the risk adjustment model. We estimate both the old and the new risk adjustment models for 2016. 13 In our analysis of the persistence of net compensation, we include data from 2015.
11 Another special feature of the Swiss payment model we do not include here is a special provision to be implemented in 2019 partly relieving the youngest age group (19-25) from risk adjustment transfers to the older age groups. The purpose of the reform is to allow insurers to offer premium discounts to young adults due to their lower risk (see Beck & Trottmann (2018) for details). 12 Copayment consists of a deductible (minimum: 300 CHF, maximum: 2500 CHF) and a co-insurance rate of 10% up to a stop-loss amount of 700 CHF. 13 For the old model, we use the publicly available RA transfers published by the official executing institution (kvg.org). These transfers are calculated based on the entire population and sum to zero within each canton (and therefore at the national level as well). The transfers for the population in our sample have a small positive average (18 CHF) revealing that the insurer is a net recipient of RA payments. For the new model, national PCG weights have not yet been estimated, and we do so based on the data from the insurer. We calculate the new RA transfers according to the methodology described in the appendix. The resulting RA transfers in the new model is Table 1 shows basic statistics for the data in 2016. Average age is 50 years and 52% of the sample are women. 7.8% of the adult population are flagged with a hospitalization stay in 2015. Average net spending was 3,875 CHF.
[ Table 1 about here] Figure 1 reports the prevalence and independent contribution of PCGs to the risk-adjustment transfers;
specifically, the coefficients on the PCG indicator in a regression controlling for other factors in the model. [ Figure 1 about here]
Extreme Outliers in Residual Spending
This section compares the extreme outliers in spending net of insurer revenues in the old and the new risk adjustment model, characterizes the health care use of the new extreme outliers, and assesses the contribution of this small group to the fit of the new risk adjustment model. The section also checks the degree to which membership in the extreme tails of the net compensation distribution persists over time.
Extremes of Residual Spending Pre and Post PCG-Based Risk Adjustment
For an insurer, spending less revenue, which we refer to as residual spending, equals spending minus copayment, premium and the risk-adjustment transfer. Figures 2-5 and Table 2 depict the shift in distribution of residual spending as the new morbidity indicators are introduced. Figure 2 and the top panel of Table 2 show the distribution of the spending residuals for the old and new risk adjustment models. In both the old and the new models, the distribution is positively skewed (note the positive very close to zero (2 CHF) but not exactly because of the out of sample projection methodology in the payment system. To assess whether the differences between the two models may be driven by differences in the underlying population, we estimate the RA transfers of the old model based on the insurer's population only. We compare the resulting residual spending with our benchmark (RA payments from official statistics based on the entire population). As the results in Table A 1 in the appendix show, the changes when using different populations are only marginal indicating that the differences in residual spending stem from the different RA models and not from different data sources. 14 Due to the specification of the risk-adjustment regression, the PCG coefficients are independent of canton of residence, age group, gender, and prior hospitalization flag. In other words, the insurer receives 3725 CHF both for a 90 years old woman with the hospitalization flag and living in Geneva as for a 20 years old man without the hospitalization flag and living in Lugano, both continually prescribed with drugs against depression. However, the full RA transfers for these two persons differ substantially due to the differences in the other risk adjustors. CHF or more goes up from 2.8% to 3.1% with the new risk adjustors; of those overcompensated by 20,000 CHF from .17% to .24%.
[ Figure 2 and Figure 3 and Table 2 CHF to 147,506 CHF (see Table 2 ) with the new morbidity indicators. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the highly overcompensated shifts to the left, away from zero. The new system creates an entirely new group of the overcompensated by 40,000 CHF or more. The average overcompensation for the bottom .1% of the residual distribution goes up from 23,832 CHF to 34,507 CHF with the new risk adjustors.
[ Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here] 4.2 Health conditions and type of spending in the extremes of the residual distribution
We now take a closer look at the extreme outlier populations in terms of residual spending to analyze how they differ in ways we can observe from the general population. Table 3 reports summary statistics for the same five groups as in Table 2 . Part of the first column is the same as in Table 1 representing the general population. Persons in the bottom .1% or 1% of the residual distribution (column 2 and 3, respectively) are on average older than both the general population and the highly undercompensated With respect to spending of course they do differ; the top .1% has spending of more than double the amount of the top 1% (of which they are also part). Among the most undercompensated, spending is predominantly for hospital care. Recall that the hospital cost sharing of 55% paid by the canton is not included in the data. If it were, the share of hospital costs would therefore be even larger.
Unfortunately, with the data we have, we cannot disaggregate the hospital cost category by condition or to see how much of hospital spending is for drugs or other forms of care.
The bottom of Table 3 reports the prevalence of selected PCG flags for the five groups. The most striking difference between the groups is prevalence of the PCG for Kidney diseases, the most highly compensated PCG (Figure 1 ). While this PCG is extremely rare in the general population, every second person in the bottom .1% group has this PCG flag. Interestingly, in the bottom 1% group the prevalence is significantly lower at 5.7%. As the bottom .1% group is part of the bottom 1% group, these numbers imply that hardly anyone with the Kidney diseases flag is in the 1% group and not in the .1% group.
It may be unsurprising that persons with a highly compensated PCG are in both the very over and very undercompensated. Given the way OLS assigns weights to a PCG flag, every CHF of undercompensation is matched by a CHF of overcompensation. Other notable differences in PCG flags 15 In case of multiple PCG flags, the contributions reported in Figure 1 are added up.
between the bottom .1% and the other groups include Diabetes type I and Transplants. Yet again, the prevalence of these groups in the underpaid is non-trivial compared to the general population indicating a high variance in these PCGs. The general pattern in PCG prevalence between the four outlier groups is a declining gradient from the most overpaid to the most underpaid. Figure 6 graphically illustrates this gradient for a selected group of PCGs. (The far-left bar for each PCG is the overall rate in the population.)
[ Table 3 and Figure 6 about here]
Extreme residuals and fit of the risk adjustment model
The research literature distinguishes between statistical fit of a risk adjustment model and payment system fit which takes account of the additional effect of reinsurance or other risk-sharing features of the payment system matching payments to insurer costs (Schmid & Beck, 2016; Layton, Ellis, McGuire, & van Kleef, 2017) . The Swiss payment model includes significant risk sharing in the form of the canton payment for 55% of hospital costs. Here, while we report the payment fit of the risk adjustment model, we focus on the unexplained variance which accounts for both risk sharing and risk adjustment features of the Swiss insurer payment system.
In our data, inclusion of PCGs in the Swiss risk adjustment model increases fit at the individual level from 16.4% to 22.7%. 16 Stating the fit statistics in another way, the new risk adjustment formula reduces the variance of health care spending not explained by the payment model from 83.6% to 77.3%. This term is known as the fraction of variance unexplained (FVU).
where Y i is actual spending for individual i, R i is the payment (premium plus risk adjustment transfer) the insurer receives for individual i, and Y ̅ is average spending. We show here that the extremes of the net compensation distribution account for a massively outsized share of this unexplained variance in the new model. We do this by fractioning the residual sum of squares (numerator of (1)) into different groups in the population:
16 These values are in line with previous research in Switzerland, although run on different data and specific PCG methodology. Schmid & Beck (2016) report a payment fit of 21.2%. Trottmann et al. (2015) report an R 2 of 21.4% from a regression including PCGs.
We then relate these group RSS to total RSS and define this fraction as the share of unexplained variance contributed by group g in the residual distribution:
We split the population into three mutually exclusive groups to allocate unexplained variance: the top .1 percentile of the residual distribution, the top 1 percentile excluding the top .1 percentile, and the remaining 99 percent of the population. The three groups are very different in size as depicted in the upper bar of Figure 7 . The lower bar of Figure 7 connects the population share of each group to the share of unexplained variance. Although group size is very different, remarkably, their share of the unexplained variance is similar. We observe a pattern of thirds: The one-in-a-thousand most highly undercompensated are responsible for 34.6% of the unexplained variance, while another 30.9% is attributable to the one-in-a-hundred highly overcompensated net of the one-in-a-thousands. The by far biggest group of the remaining 99% of the population contributes only 34.5% of unexplained variance.
Unsurprisingly, the corresponding SUV numbers when applied to the other end of the distribution, i.e. the overcompensated, are much less spectacular (1.5%, 3.2%, 95.3%).
[ Figure 7 about here]
Persistence
Predictability of health care spending is one determinant of incentives for adverse selection. In simple terms, if individuals can predict their spending, they will tend to sort into more generous plans causing the form of selection problems described by Einav and Finkelstein (2011) . If plans can predict which type of potential enrollees have high or low residuals (after risk adjustment and other payment features), they may distort the form of their coverage to attract/deter the winners/losers (see Glazer & McGuire (2000) and Beck, Trottmann, & Zweifel (2010) for an empirical application in Switzerland).
Persistence of spending or residuals is one indicator of how well individuals or plans can predict. We investigate the correlation of payment residuals over time, replicating our analysis for 2015 to investigate how many individuals who are outliers in 2016 are also outliers in the previous year. 17 Table   4 [ Table 4 about here]
Discussion
Sophisticated morbidity-based risk adjustment systems, used in publicly run individual health insurance markets world-wide, greatly underpay a very small fraction of the population, and greatly overpay another. While the presence of underpayment is well-known, the presence of large overpayments in these systems has gone largely unnoticed. This paper focuses on the very highly under-and very highly overcompensated, those in the top and bottom 1% and .1% of the distribution of residual spending. Although small in number, these few make a massively out-sized contribution to incentives and to measures of performance of payment systems.
Although on opposite sides of the distribution of residual spending, the extreme outliers in the population share the same diseases. PCG morbidity indicators associated with the highly overpaid are largely the same as those associated with the highly underpaid. This finding implies that the variance of spending in some high-spending morbidity groups is also high. One next step in research should be to study in more detail the small number of morbidities falling on both sides of the distribution of residual spending to investigate what, if anything, should be done in payment models to address high variance within a morbidity group.
Our specific results imply kidney disease is the place to start in Switzerland. Half of the population overpaid by more than 24k CHF (the bottom .1% of the residual spending distribution) have kidney disease. In light of the persistence we find in terms of membership in the tails of the residual spending distribution, it may be that those with kidney disease can be prospectively grouped into those who would be very undercompensated in the present system and those who would be highly overcompensated. If so, fit and incentives in the Swiss payment model could be improved, perhaps significantly, for an important and vulnerable group of the population.
A very high portion of the unexplained variance in the Swiss insurer payment model rests in the extreme upper tail of the residual spending distribution. Recalling our finding of thirds, fully one-third of the unexplained variance in residual spending is attributable to the one-in-a-thousand people on the upper extreme of residual spending. Our findings for Switzerland are consistent with recent research on the extremely underpaid in Germany, The Netherlands and the U.S. Marketplaces (McGuire, Schillo, & van Kleef, 2018) . There is a straightforward way to decrease underpayment for this currently extremely underpaid group: supplement risk adjustment with a form of reinsurance that pays an insurer a share of spending after spending on an individual exceeds a threshold. Using reinsurance funds most efficiently requires this threshold to be defined in terms of residual spending, not just high spending (McGuire, Schillo, & van Kleef, 2018) . Increasing payments to the presently highly undercompensated could markedly improve the performance of the payment system. This may be particularly valuable in the Swiss health insurance market with its many small insurers.
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One limitation of our study is that the PCG definitions for 2020 have not been finalized. We used the PCG definitions of the data provider instead which uses this list to pay managed care providers.
Although some PCGs are likely not to appear on the final list while new ones may be added, we are confident that our main results will be robust to these modifications. In support of this belief, Trottmann et al. (2015) report a similar payment fit using a PCG list with some differences from ours.
Although constituting about 16% of the national market, the population of the insurer studied here is not entirely representative of the general population. As noted above in the data section, the insurer supplying the data is a net recipient of risk adjustment transfers, indicating its population is somewhat sicker than the general population.
We emphasize that our findings do not question the value of including morbidity indicators in an insurer payment model, either in Switzerland or elsewhere. Selection problems are almost certainly reduced overall by doing so. However, it is important to recognize that selection incentives are partly redirected after including these adjustors. There are new incentives to select individuals within disease categories where large profits can be gained by, for example, recruiting to a plan those with kidney disease likely to fall in the highly overcompensated group (Brown, Duggan, Kuziemko, & Woolston, 2014; Newhouse, Price, McWilliams, Hsu, & McGuire, 2014) . Sophisticated morbidity-based risk adjustors mitigate the losses a plan might face by enrolling an individual with a costly illness, but at the same time the risk adjustors create new profits an insurer might gain from recruiting a subset of those with costly illnesses who do not in fact incur those costs.
18 22 of the 52 health insurers have a risk pool of less than 30,000 customers. Notes: Yearly numbers. Age is measured in categories of 5 years and set to the mean of each bin assuming a uniform distribution. The mean of any dummy variable is equivalent to the relative frequency. Notes: Spending categories are reported in gross numbers, i.e. including copayment, as net spending categories lack the spending for which the deductible and coinsurance was paid. overpaid by >10,000 overpaid by >20,000 underpaid by >10,000
underpaid by >20,000
Over/Underpayment
Old model New model with PCG So far, we have established maximum likelihood estimates for group averages ̂ and surcharges ̂.
We still need overall cantonal means to derive RA-contributions. In order to simplify notation, we attribute each individual to his or her risk group value, ̂( ), and for those with PCG eligibility the corresponding ̂( ) value. For all individuals, resident of canton C, ( ), we can calculate cantonal average spending, ̅ : This expression meets the political requirement of a zero-sum game within each canton. 20 These contributions and especially the impact of ̂( ) on over-and underpayment is going to be analyzed in the following sections. 20 The proof relies on the fact that the sum of deviations from a sample mean is always zero.
A. Tables   Minimum Median  Mean  Maximum Change in % -0 -0 -0 0 -0
Notes:
The table reports summary statistics of residual spending with RA payments from two different sources. In every panel, the upper row is identical to the one in Table 2 , where the RA payments are taken from the official statistics (kvg.org) and calculated based on the entire Swiss population. In the lower row, RA payments are calculated based on the insurer's population, i.e. the same population used to calculate the RA payments in the new RA model with PCGs. 
